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Questioning New Materialisms 
 
In their New Materialisms, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost put together a sustained and coherent 
theory around a number of vitalist and materialist studies that were emerging as novel ways of 
thinking about matter. Driven by scientific and technological advances they sought to rehabilitate 
matter from the oubliettes of history, and to reinstate insights from the great materialists of the 
nineteenth century (Marx, Nietzsche and Freud), fusing these two areas together to form this new 
materialism (Coole and Frost, 2010: 5). An inspiration for, and a contributor to the volume, Jane 
Bennett (2010) has since vastly expanded on the work of Coole and Frost, drawing from a vast and 
varied literature, going back to Lucretius and Spinoza as sources of inspiration for a vitalist theory of 
materialism for the twenty-first century. Her work has been particularly influential, and is cited 
across disciplinary boundaries in the humanities and social sciences. Straight off the bat, Coole, 
&ƌŽƐƚ ? ĂŶĚ ĞŶŶĞƚƚ ?Ɛ materialisms were engaged and critical forms of materialism, interested not 
only in understanding the interaction between matter and the social world, but also in shaping it and 
critiquing its abuses. Climate change and global capital flows are just as much part of this theory as 
advances in biotechnologies and quantum mechanics. A form of radical politics thus emerges from 
Coole, Frost, and Bennett ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚ ŝƐĂ ƚŚĞŵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů section. To 
paraphrase DĂƌǆ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ĞůĞǀĞŶ ŽŶ &ĞƵĞƌďĂĐŚ ? ƚŚĞ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ
matter, but to use them to bring about change.  
This re-enacted form of materialism is supposed to celebrate the transfiguration of debates 
between vitalism and materialism that had long taken place not only in French philosophy, between 
philosophies of life and philosophies of the concept, but in all theories giving priority to agents 
others to structures. Far from being a consensus  ?  or even a virtuality  ?  new materialism should be 
carefully interrogated in the now famous question-form: what is the name of materialism? Instead 
of canonising and setting up new signifiers, we have opted here for an intensification and a 
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ŵƵůƚŝƉůǇŝŶŐŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? “,ŽǁŵĂŶǇŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵƐ PŽŶĞŽƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?ŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ
emerging question of this special section. This question should be understood as performative, in 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ “ŽƉĞŶ ? ?/Ŷ ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇƚŚĂƚŶĞǁŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝƐ
said to be new scientific and social accounts of the performative nature of matter, and its 
consequences for the human species, we would like to multiply materialism, to find in the plurality 
not a last refuge but through the performativity of the letter new possibilities for further inquiries. 
The quarrel of materialisms is not a singularity that is supposed to go beyond the fetishised and 
over-branded movements, deconstruction, poststructuralism, Marxism and critical theory, but a 
putting forth of problems. In the following sections, we do six things: first we set the scene for the 
rise of new materialisms, by linking the movement developments in the sciences, and by showing 
how these developments have affected social and political theory, particularly through the work of 
Diana Coole, Samantha Frost and Jane Bennett. Second, we establish criteria for inclusion and 
ĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ŶĞǁ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚ ? ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁŝůů ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?
Third, fourth, fifth, and sixth, we introduce four key themes from the investigation to come, and 
critically appraise them: the historical, posthumanist, technological and emancipatory facets of the 
new materialisms, each posing a question that sets the scene for the problématique of the special 
section. We show that there are numerous areas of expansion for the study of materialisms, and 
that the quarrel between its various forms is productive of a critical approach to matter in general. 
By foregrounding the four concepts of history, posthumanism, technology, and emancipation, we 
highlight how the research by the four authors of this special section, Arianne Conty, Paul Rekret, 
Dorothy Kwek and Alexander Wilson, each contribute to the appraisal of new materialism claims, 




First, iƚ ŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽƐĞƚďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐĨŽƌǁŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐ “ŶĞǁŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƐŽŵĞ
problems that help guide this special section (Bühlmann, Colman and van der Tuin, 2017). Though 
Coole, Frost and Bennett are all political theorists, the new materialisms are not limited to their 
work. Bruno Latour, a significant influence for many theories of the agency of things, as we shall see, 
is himself both a philosopher and anthropologist by training, has published extensively in the fields 
of sociology, history, law, and media studies. There is no discipline in the humanities and social 
sciences that has not had some engagement with these new materialisms, and some engagement in 
the sciences has also been important; hence a complete survey of the scope of the new materialism 
is beyond the scope of what can be done here. Nevertheless, we can establish three criteria that 
guide our analysis of the quarrel of materialisms presented here. First, there is an emphasis on the 
novelty of the theory. Second, there is an ontological claim that is made (either explicitly or 
implicitly) about the nature of matter and how it impacts our lives. And finally, there are methodical 
implications of taking material objects seriously in our academic practices. Each of these three 
ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ƉŽƐĞƐ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞ ǁŝůů ŶŽǁ ƚĂŬĞ ŝŶ ƚƵƌŶ ? ďƵƚ ƚŽ ƋƵĂůŝĨǇ ĂƐ Ă  “ŶĞǁ
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚ ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂǁŽƌŬŵƵƐƚŵĞĞƚĂůůƚŚƌĞĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ ? 
 The first criterion of novelty is problematic for obvious reasons, in that is often obfuscates 
ƚŚĞŝŶĚĞďƚĞĚŶĞƐƐŽĨ “ŶĞǁ ?ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŽůĚĞƌǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐ ?/ƚĂůƐŽŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂďƌĞĂŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
past of materialism is needed, often without providing sufficient justifications for such a break. As 
we will see in what follows, the novelty criterion is often more a rhetorical devise, designed to 
answer demands by publishers, editorial boards, and anonymous referees for originality, 
breakthroughs in knowledge, and new arguments. A common marketing ploy, the emphasis on 
novelty is required by the standards of our industry, but it often overemphasises the part of the 
 “ŶĞǁ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ǁŽƌŬƐ ?At the same time, there is something lazy and dismissive in claiming that 
nothing is truly new and it has been done (or said) before. We will see that three of the main authors 
of the new materialisms (Coole, Frost, and Bennett), are conscious of this limitation, and go to 
significant lengths to address it, each of them pointing out historical precedents for their own 
 4 
theories. In this special section, Kwek will also argue that older materialisms can be rescued from 
often neglected corners of history and speak to us today in important ways. The emphasis will be 
placed on understanding new materialisms not as entirely novel, but rather as ways of engaging 
older forms of materialism with present concerns. Yet this raises more structural questions directly 
related to materialism. Why is it that there is a need for a clean break with the past for our topic in 
particular? It may be that the spectre of Marxism looms large over theories of materialism, and that 
it has become difficult (particularly in the United States) to use Marxism in a critical and engaged 
manner. It is certainly evident that Coole, Frost, and Bennett have all been influenced in part by 
Marx and Marxism more generally, but are reluctant to bring this connection to the fore of their 
work. Rekret, in this special section, will draw out a political critique of this tendency, and show the 
limitations of seeking novelty without adding a more substantive economic critique to the field of 
materialism.  
 The second criterion is that new materialisms, as was the case with old materialisms, 
foreground the primacy of matter of other aspects of human life. Historically, as we will see, this 
took of the form as arguing that bodies can think, as in the work of La Mettrie, that thinking is not 
located in the immaterial soul but rather in the material brain. Today, many new materialisms have 
radicalised this view and accepted the claim of Actor Network Theory (ANT) that agency is not 
limited to human beings, or even to sentient beings, but that material things can in fact act in 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůǁĂǇƐ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ƚƵƌŶ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŽďũĞĐƚ-oriented ontology has provided a set of justifications for 
the primacy of material objects in fields as varied as legal theory (Mussawir and Parsley, 2017) or art 
(Bennett, 2015). Conty, in the present special section, complicates ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?Ɛ
work within various materialist theories, by delving on the ontological claims on two sides of the 
new materialism. Others have also drawn from speculative philosophy to build their materialism, 
notably through the work of Quentin Meillassoux (2006). Taken seriously by Dolphijn and van der 
dƵŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ? DĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆ ?Ɛ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇ ŝƐ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŽĨ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
connection between facts in the world and human access to those facts. An alternative to >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?Ɛ
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ontology, it also proposes a model of agency that refuses to place the human at the centre of Being, 
ĂŶĚĚƌĂǁƐŽŶĂĚŝŽƵ ?ƐŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůĂǆŝŽŵƐĂƐĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŝƚƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?dŚŽƵŐŚůĂƌŐĞůǇŝŐŶŽƌĞĚďǇ
ŽŽůĞ ?&ƌŽƐƚĂŶĚĞŶŶĞƚƚ ?DĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶce is growing in the field, and both Rekret and Wilson 
draw on his work in a critical manner in this special section, and engage with his ontology to 
foreground the implications of a speculative materialism.  
 Finally, there are methodical implications of this new materialism. For the authors of this 
introduction, the most important methodical implication is that there is no unique version of the 
new materialism. Rather, it is better to think of it as a plural assemblage of materialisms, a cross-
fertilisation of various theories that often have similar influences, but with different inflections and 
implications. Seeking unity is not the goal here, but drawing from a rich and fruitful engagement 
with materialisms, old and new, ontologically and culturally diverse, allows for new methods of 
engagement with our disciplines, and importantly across disciplinary boundaries. Because many 
authors coming from very different fields share similar outlooks on the importance of material 
objects on our lives and experiences, they can draw on different traditions and debates for 
inspiration. The methodical implications are inevitably plural in the sense that they refuse a unifying 
methodology, under one logos or Reason, but adopt various methods from varied areas of 
knowledge that can inform other disciplines. Thus, a political scientist can learn from a religious text, 
a cartographer from anthropology, or a philosopher from physics. The beauty of a plural materialism 
is that it provides a thin common ontological frame to understand varied phenomena otherwise 
difficult to consider jointly. Pluralism is here a strength, and leads to encounters that would not have 
ďĞĞŶ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ǁŝĚĞ ĂƉƉĞĂůŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ŶĞǁŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵƐ ? ?This includes, importantly, not 
only an openness to interdisciplinarity in the humanities and social sciences, but a fundamental 
quest for incorporating developments in the hard sciences (neuroscience, quantum mechanics, 
relativistic physics) and the technological developments that come out of these fields into our social 
and political theories. By engaging with the work of Stiegler in this introduction, as Conty does in her 
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article in this special section, we also aim to make put this technological question at the forefront of 
new materialist agendas, something that remains a lacuna of much of the literature.  
 
Four main themes emerge from the literature on new materialisms, themes that remain important 
for us here. In the first instance, the new materialisms is as much a continuation and 
reinterpretation of the old as it is purely novel, second it is posited as a posthumanist theory, third 
its political implementation is understood in terms of biopolitics and biotechnologies, and finally its 
study is, as we have just seen, critical and engaged, in a political sense. Let us take these in turn, and 
critically appraise their potency as theoretical constructs.  
In the first instance, the precise novelty of these new materialisms remained a point of 
contention of the present authors. As Coole and Frost are acutely aware themselves, old 
materialisms (such as that of Spinoza, or more recently that of Deleuze and Guattari), had made 
similar challenges to the Cartesian-Newtonian-Euclidian model. Bennett similarly identifies a number 
of historical authors as sources of inspiration for her vitalist account of materialism: among which 
Thoreau (2004: 348) or La Mettrie (Coole and Frost: 2010: 47). Let us focus on two historical 
materialist sources (La Mettrie and Zhuangzi) that have influenced the new materialisms in order to 
critically engage with their contribution to knowledge. In 1748, Julien Offray de La Mettrie published 
a ground-shaking book entitled > ?Homme Machine  W Man a Machine. In the book, La Mettrie argues 
that the Cartesian conception of animals as automata should be extended to human beings. There is 
no good reason, he argues, for excluding human beings from the animal real, and man is thus no 
more than a machine, comprised of materials differently modified from the one substance that 
unites us all (Thomson, 1996). The treatise, a blasphemous work even by the standard of the 
tolerant Netherlands where he lived at the time, forced La Mettrie to another exile in Berlin at the 
court of Frederick the Great. His soulless philosophy, following the ontology previously established 
by Spinoza, formulated a challenge to conceptions of agency that the new materialisms have merely 
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ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚ ?>ĂDĞƚƚƌŝĞ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂŐĞŶĐǇ ŝŶĂůůŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚhey 
are in the form of electricity, in animal form, or ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŚĂƉĞ ŽĨ Ă ŚƵŵĂŶ ďĞŝŶŐ ? :ĂŶĞ ĞŶŶĞƚƚ ?Ɛ
ascription of agency to power blackouts (2010: 47), and her critique of the theory of the uniqueness 
of human agency as a theological concept (2010: 59) are both indebted to La Mettrie. Almost half a 
century ago, Karl Popper had noted this indebtedness of contemporary thinkers to La Mettrie, when 
ŚĞ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƋƵĂŶƚƵŵ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? >Ă DĞƚƚƌŝĞ ?Ɛ  “ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂŶ ŝƐ Ă ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞ ŚĂƐ ƚŽĚĂǇ
perhaps more defendeƌƐ ƚŚĂŶ ĞǀĞƌ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƉŚǇƐŝĐŝƐƚƐ ? ďŝŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P
224). Frost, who has written extensively on Hobbes (2008), also acknowledges that the new is often 
heavily indebted to the old when it comes to theories of materialism, and Bennett openly cites him 
as an inspiration for her own work.  
In her article in this special section ?  “dŚĞ /ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĞŝŶŐ hƐĞůĞƐƐ P  ƌŽƐƐ-Cultural 
Contribution to the New Materialisms from Zhuangzi ? ?ŽƌŽƚŚǇ<ǁĞŬƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐĂŶĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ
ĂŶ  “ŽůĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ƚŚĞancient proto-Daoist text, Zhuangzi. Placing this ancient tradition in the 
realm of the ontological turn occasioned by Latour, Bennett, and Descola, Kwek introduces us to the 
oneiric chaƌĂĐƚĞƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞǆƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ƵƐĞůĞƐƐ ƚƌĞĞ ? ? dŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ Ă
ĐĂƌƉĞŶƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ  “ƵƐĞůĞƐƐ ? ƚƌĞĞ ŝŶ Ă ĚƌĞĂŵ ƌĞǀĞĂůƐ Ă ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ĂĨĨŝŶŝƚŝĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ
inanimate matter and us, not merely by questioning the definition of uselesƐŶĞƐƐ  ?ƚŚĞ ƚƌĞĞ ?Ɛ
uselessness for humans is certainly of use to its own survival), but by providing access to an 
ŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌůĚůǇƋƵĂůŝƚǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĞĞďǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽ ƚŚĞĐŽůĚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ŵĂƐƚĞƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
carpenter. Applying lessons from the useless tree of the Zhuangzi to contemporary technological 
questions, Kwek further illustrates the interplay between old and new forms of materialisms. 
Through a series of encounters  W with the planned obsolescence of mass production and the utility 
of broken things  W the precise uselessness of a thing becomes its own strength and character, 
ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂĐƚĂŶƚƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚ ƚŽ ŶĞǁ ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ ŚĞŝŐŚƚƐ ? dŚŝƐ ĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ
technological question raised above then allows Kwek to place the Zhuangzi into conversation with 
ŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƐŵŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?ŶŽƚĂďůǇ^ƉŝŶŽǌĂ ?ƐEthics and works inspired by it. This first critical appraisal led us 
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to formulate the following question: which historical forms of materialism can be salvaged from the 
forgotten corners of history, and actualised to help us better understand the challenge that matter 
poses for critical social and political thought today? 
 
Secondly, Coole and Frost posit the new ontology of their materialism as one that seeks to move 
past the Cartesian-Newtonian-Euclidian straightjacket. For these scientific models, in contrast to the 
ůĂƚĞƌ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀŝƐƚŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƋƵĂŶƚƵŵ ŵŽĚĞůƐ ?  “ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĂďůǇ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞ ? ? ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ŽŶůǇ
 “ƵƉŽŶ ĂŶ ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ĨŽƌcĞ Žƌ ĂŐĞŶƚ ? ?  “ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ Ă ůŝŶĞĂƌ ůŽŐŝĐ ŽĨ ĐĂƵƐe and 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? dŚŝƐ ŵŽĚĞů ? ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ Ă ƐŝŵƉůŝƐƚŝĐ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ŝƐ ŵĞƌĞůǇ Ă
 “ƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽďĞĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ-acting human subject, conceives of matter as dead rather 
than acting, and the human soul as the source of all movement, having been granted its power by 
God. In contrast to this model of matter-as-inert, the ontology of Spinoza (among others) is put to 
the fore. The material world need not be conceived as inert, but rather as the source of all 
movement, including our own. Matter is conceived as the determinant of all action, including human 
action, but also as the source of agency, creativity, and as a generative power ?ƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶĞŶŶĞƚƚ ?Ɛ
 “ĞŶĐŚĂŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƐ ŽƵƌ ĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽƚŚĞ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ĂƐ sites of 
opportunity rather than as sites of dry determination (Bennett, 2001), Coole and Frost attempt to 
ƌĞƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĞ  “ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ? ĞĚŝĨŝĐĞ ŽĨ ĐĂƵƐĂůŝƚǇ ? ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ƚŝŵĞ ĂŶĚ ƐƉĂĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐƚĞĂĚ ? ƚŚĞǇ
propose a model where linear causality is replaced with bifurcations, agency conceived as both 
determined and free, and opened up to non-humans (including material objects), and where time 
and space are given their relativistic existence a thorough consideration, as William Connolly had 
pointed out in previous work (2002).  
 The challenge to traditional conceptions of modernity owes much to the work of Bruno 
Latour (Elam 1999; Jensen and Blok, 2013; Hornborg, 2014; Latour 2017) as well as Donna Harraway 
(Harraway and Wolfe 2016). In his We Have Never Been Modern, Latour (1993: 10-12) challenges the 
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ĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘'ƌĞĂƚ ŝǀŝĚĞ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĂƚĞƐ Ă ĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƐ ? ĂƐ
westerns, the Them, as anything other. In its stead, Latour proposes to understand relations 
between culture, nonhuman nature, and their respective intersections as hybrid networks, where 
actants include not only those traditionally considered in modernity, but also material and living 
nonhuman forces, acting in hybrid networks. What has become known as Actor-Network Theory 
foregrounds Ă ĨŽƌŵŽĨ  “ĨůĂƚŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂůůĂĐƚĂŶƚƐĂƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚŽŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƉůĂŶĞ ?dŚŝƐ ƚǇƉĞŽĨ
ontology is crucial to the analyses of all contributors to the present special section, as the challenge 
to conceptions of agency cannot be undone altogether. >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?ƐŽǁŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚŝǀŝĚĞ
has become hegemonic in new materialist literature, and some critics have rightly questioned its 
political implications (Neyrat 2016a; Neyrat 2016b; Dillet 2017; Luisetti 2017). Indeed, by arguing 
that everything constructible and celebrating the (conceptual) end of nature, is this not re-affirming 
positions inherited from modernity (Descartes, Bacon) or even more problematically is this not 
providing philosophical arguments compatible with geo-engineering projects? Much like Rekret, 
another important critique of Latour has recently been put forward by Alf Hornborg (2017) and 
Andreas Malm (2018): for them, it is politically dangerous to give an ontological priority to matter 
over human action, inanimate matter cannot be said to have as much agency as humans. Against 
neo-materialists, Malm (2018: 93) notes that some authors have dissipated human responsibility 
ĨƌŽŵĐůŝŵĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞďǇĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĐŽĂů ŝƚƐĞůĨďĞĂƌƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ  ‘ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŚĂƉĞĚƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶƐ
ǁŚŽ ƵƐĞĚ ŝƚ ĨĂƌ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ĐŽĂů ?  ?>ĞĂŝŶ  ? ? ? ? P   ? ? ? Coal or oil do not have 
intentionality or a political agenda of their own ? ŽƵƌ  ‘ǁĂƌŵŝŶŐ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? is not posthuman but 
 ‘ŚǇƉĞƌŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶĐĞŝƚŝƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇ ‘ƌĞƉĞƌĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?DĂůŵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?Thus,
new materialists have provided some new conceptual tools to make the Anthropocene as a 
 ‘ŚǇƉĞƌŽďũĞĐƚ ? ŵŽƌĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂďůĞ ĂŶĚ ǇĞƚits Latourian strand has failed to provide a 
programmatic perspective. 
&Žƌ ZĞŬƌĞƚ ĂŶĚ tŝůƐŽŶ ? >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬraises important questions regarding the turn to 
ontology which acts as a precursor to the new materialisms discussed herein, and potentially a 
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source of conflict with more traditional material interests in social relations. For Kwek, the impact of 
>ĂƚŽƵƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶĞŶŶĞƚƚŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĐĞŶƚƌĂů ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐĨŽƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐƚŽƐƉƌŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚŝŶǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ
directions, including her focus on the Zhuangzi and its ecological implications. >ĂƚŽƵƌ ?ƐŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
stance was further expanded upon by Graham Harman, whose Quadruple Object (2011) summarises 
and builds on his earlier work on object-oriented ontology. Rejecting both the undermining and 
overmining of objects, Harman argues for an equal standing for all being. The focus on the human 
subject has lost its justification altogether, and the result of both actor-network theory and object-
oriented ontology is that material objects are given a much more prominent, active, and central part 
in new philosophies of materialism.  
In her article in this special section, "The Politics of Nature: New Materialist Responses to 
the Anthropocene", Arianne Conty focuses on the ways New Materialist approaches build upon the 
work of Bruno Latour, taking his notion of shared agency in two different directions. First, toward a 
flat ontology that treats all agency equally, exemplified in Jane Bennett, which ends up reifying 
technological artefacts as separate from human agency. Second, toward a new dichotomy between 
the animate and the inanimate, exemplified in the work of anthropologists like Tim Ingold and 
Eduardo Kohn.  In order to develop an adequate response to the Anthropocene, Conty prefers the 
second option, and uses Kohn's development of thinking selves to include not only animals but 
ecosystems in order to move beyond the limitations of Latour's representational democratic model 
to embrace a politics of nature that allows the non-human selves that share our world to be heard. 
Engaging with the second question cited above, regarding the emancipatory potential of technology, 
Conty argues that both technological and human actants ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ ĂƐ  “techno-human 
ŚǇďƌŝĚƐ ? ?ƚŚƵƐĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ more luddite conceptions of technology. Finally, Conty argues that our 
very political structures would benefit from a more thorough engagement with new materialist 
ontologies. If actants extend beyond human beings, no political theory is complete without an 
engagement with non-human actants, and our current representative models are incomplete if they 
allow for ignoring these other actants ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?
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The third ƉŝůůĂƌŽĨŽŽůĞĂŶĚ&ƌŽƐƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƌĞƐƚƐŽŶĂƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚďŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ďŝŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ, 
and biotechnologies and their material concerns. Advances in technologies of life are said to have 
had so much of an impact as to redefine our conceptions of humanity. The mapping of the human 
genome and progress in genetically modified organisms are two important consequences of these 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ “WƌŽŵĞƚŚĞĂŶ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƌŵĂƐƚĞƌǇŽǀĞƌŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞŽůĚĂĚĂŐĞƚŚĂƚ
these new technologies will lead to human improvement are put under the microscope of the social 
theorist. The biopolitical consequences of these advances, stemming from the works of Foucault 
(Lemke, 2015) and Agamben (1998), are all-too-clear: these new techniques can as easily become 
elements of control and discipline as they can form part of an emancipatory politics. One can 
imagine a number of paths open for the future: one where increasing control over biological 
processes leads to the eradication of famine, higher life expectancy, and a strengthening of the 
ĞĂƌƚŚ ?ƐĞĐŽƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŽƌŽŶĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƐĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĂƌĞĐŽŵŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚ ?ƐŽůĚto the highest bidder, used 
with disregard for economic externalities, and contribute to a further degradation of our already-
fragile ecosystems. The task for a critical appraisal of these new biopolitical practices becomes all-
the-more important, to prevent the latter scenario from materialising itself.  
 This concern for understanding radical theories of matter is not entirely new nor is it limited 
to the biological sciences. In 1905, Albert Einstein published a series of four papers in the Annalen 
der Physik that he had been researching while working in the Bern patent office before he found his 
first academic post. These papers quickly revolutionised the discipline of physics, and introduced, 
ĂŵŽŶŐŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŝŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂ PA?ŵĐ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌůĞss poetically transcribed then as 
M = L/V² (Einstein, 1905: 641). This simple equation challenged how we conceive of matter. Any 
material object (m = mass) is comprised of energy (E = energy), and indeed a previously 
inconceivable amount of energy (c² = the speed of light squared). The best illustration of this 
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potential energy is witnessed in nuclear fission or fusion, where the splitting or combining of atoms 
releases part of this energy contained in matter, with spectacular effects. This Annus Mirabilis of 
physics has yet to find its equivalent in other sciences, yet to a lesser extent, the revival of a novel 
theory of materialisms have pushed the boundaries of social and political thought to take seriously 
advances in the natural sciences to better formulate theories of culture and society (Barad, 2007). 
 Yet the question of technology remains peripheral to the new materialist agenda, an 
important lack in the analysis of how matter influences our lives. More often than not, new 
technologies are perceived more as a threat to existing freedoms, to privacy, or to the fragility of 
Nature rather than being re-thought in critical and emancipatory ways. Bernard Stiegler, on the 
other hand, had proposed just such a thinking about technics, where the technical object is posited 
ŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂƐĂŚƵŵĂŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚĂƐĂŶ “ĞǆƚĞƌŝŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?1998: 152). Thus, contrary 
to Latour for whom a politics of nature is about welcoming nonhumans into the public sphere, for 
Stiegler, the human and the technical object cannot be separated entirely, inasmuch as human 
beings are technical beings that always already exist as tool-users. This is explained through the 
Greek myth of Epimetheus, the counter-part to Prometheus, and an alternative to the model which 
posits human as dominating Nature. Epimetheus, set with the task of giving creatures their suitable 
powers, forgets to give one to humans, who are left weak and unprotected compared with others 
creatures. Prometheus, ƐĞĞŝŶŐŚŝƐďƌŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ?ŐŝǀĞƐŚƵŵĂŶƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇ to make fire to redress 
this injustice (1998: 187- ? ? ?&Žƌ^ƚŝĞŐůĞƌ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƉŝŵĞƚŚĞƵƐ ? ĨĂƵůƚ ŝƐthe most important part of 
ƚŚĞƉƵǌǌůĞ ?,ƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐ “ǁŝůůŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶďƵƚƚŚĞĨĂƵůƚ ?ĂĨĂƵůƚƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ
but the de-fault of origin or the origin as de-fault [ůĞĚĠĨĂƵƚĚ ?ŽƌŝŐŝŶĞŽƵ ů ?ŽƌŝŐŝŶĞĐŽŵŵĞĚĠĨĂƵƚ] ?
(1998: 188). Having a default of origin, human beings have developed technical objects to help them 
fill this lack, but simultaneously endow these objects as part mechanical, part biological. Technical 
objects, in other words, are neither purely inorganic nor organic, they are material objects that 
straddle the divide  W being made from inorganic matter by organic beings. If technical objects are 
extensions of our very nature as human beings, there is no avoiding the question of technology. By 
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introducing the concept of the pharmakon, Stiegler hopes to convey the dual-potential of technical 
objects. They have the ability to emancipate and kill, to heal and to poison. The choice is between 
technical objects as healing objects, that enable humanity to develop itself, or technical objects used 
for their destructive potential. The crisis of modern times, Stiegler concludes, is all-the-more 
pressing in that it requires important decisions (Krisis, in Greek, means decision), in order for us to 
take care of ourselves and to favour healing over destruction (2013: 4-5). As Ben Turner (2016) 
ŶŽƚĞƐ ?^ƚŝĞŐůĞƌ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐĚĞĞƉůǇŝŶĚĞďƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚƵŵĂŶĂŶĚŶŽŶ-human so dear 
to new materialists. Though Stiegler derives his new materialism from Derrida rather than Latour, it 
has the added advantage of placing the notion of technology at the forefront of a politics of 
différance.  
 In this special section ? ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ tŝůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ  “ĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ Eeomaterialist Divide: Negotiating 
ĞƚǁĞĞŶ ůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ sŝƚĂů DĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ǁŝƚŚ /ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ dŚĞŽƌǇ ? ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ
ĂƌĞ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? EŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
these, he argues that the quantum physical construal of the integrated information theory of 
consciousness can provide a way out of some of these issues. Wilson highlights that there are at 
least two contradictory branches of the new materialisms: the rationalist and the vitalist conceptions 
(Lash, 2006). The rational conception, embodied in the work of Quentin Meillassoux (2006), is 
confronted with the vitalist conception of Bruno Latour. The impasse is between two 
incommensurable conceptions of matter: one that sees matter as dead and inert, but ontologically 
prior to consciousness, and the other that sees matter as alive and acting, with no claim to primacy 
by either the human or the non-human possible. What the integrated information theory can 
achieve is to provide a set of guidelines to help the new materialists with claims to agency and 
sentience of non-human beings. dŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐĂƉƉĞĂůŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĂǁĂǇƚŽ distinguish between 
sentient and non-ƐĞŶƚŝĞŶƚ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĨĂůůŝŶŐ ƉƌĞǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ
potentially allows us to get beyond one of the primary theoretical dilemmas faced by the new 
materialisms. It certainly allows us to bridge the divide between different forms of materialism, and 
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to help us with the technological questions raised by these new theories in a novel and consistent 
manner. Relating these theoretical insights to questions of sentience in technology, Wilson further 
ŵĂŬĞƐ Ă ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ƌĂŝƐĞĚ ĂďŽǀĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵƐ ?
technological problématique. ThĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ƐƵŶŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆŝŵƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŽĨĂŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐƚŚĞŽƌǇŚĞůƉƐƵƐ
to bridge the divide between different forms of materialism, and to help us with the technological 
questions raised by these new theories in a novel and consistent manner. The question that arises 
for the new materialism is thus: under which conditions can technological advances become 
emancipatory rather than disciplinary, and which social and political theory would enable this 
healing pharmacological dimension to emerge?  
 
Fourth comes the question of formulating a critical and politically engaged new materialism. It is 
doubtless that the materialist gap left by Marx is difficult to fill, and yet it has provided much 
inspiration for theories of new materialism. A political economy of matter is ever needed, as it is 
apparent that the brief period of liberal consensus following the fall of the Berlin wall and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union has not led to emancipation for the human species as a whole. Coole, 
Frost, and Bennett are very well aware of this tension between the discredit of Marx (or more 
precisely, of certain forms of Marxism), and the need for an engaged and political-active materialist 
theory. They propose a form of materialism that is not against Marx, but rather which revives the 
ƌĂĚŝĐĂůŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŵĂĚĞďǇDĂƌǆŚŝŵƐĞůĨ PƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚŝŶŐƐǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŵŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƵŶĂƐƐĂŝůĂďůĞ W such 
ĂƐ ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐ ĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ůŝďĞƌĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞĨƌ Ğ ? ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐ ƐĞůĨ ? ĂƌĞ ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ďǇ
material, social, and collective forces (Coole and Frost, 2010: 26; Bennett 2001: 119). The point is to 
keep this orientation alive, without falling into dogmatic or subservient theorising. Instead, a 
methodological and ontological pluralism is advocated, motivated by a desire to keep many 
emancipatory approaches under the umbrella of a progressive new materialism, including the 
theories of Bourdieu, Lefebvre, de Certeau, de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, and Althusser. Similarly, 
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Bennett argues that the world can be re-enchanted even with commodities, such as the power of 
commercial art to resist the iron system of capital (Bennett 2001: 122). She draws on the work of 
ĚŽƌŶŽĂŶĚ,ŽƌŬŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ<ĂŶƚ ?ƐƚŚŝƌĚCritique, NietzscŚĞ ?ƐzĞĂ^ĂǇŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞůĞƵǌŝĂŶ
imaginary to formulate an emancipatory theory of artistic engagement.  
 This pluralism is welcome, yet it raises questions with regards to the coherence ŽĨ  “ŶĞǁ
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵƐ ? ? ZĞĐĞŶƚ ǁŽƌŬƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐĨŝeld of enquiry. For example, Maria 
Fannin, Julie MacLeavy, Wendy Larner, and Wenfei Winnie Wang have contributed to a 
reconceptualisation of new materialist conceptions of feminism (Fannin et al., 2014) building on van 
ĚĞƌ dƵŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ  ? ? ? ? ? ?, while Andrea Doucet has discussed the new materialism of fathering 
(Doucet, 2013). Stacy Alaimo (2012) has recently explored the consequences of new materialisms for 
issues of sustainability, climate change, and ecology. Tom Lundborg and Nick Vaughan-Williams have 
applied the new materialisms to the method of discourse analysis in International Relations, a 
method that has been increasingly careful of including material agents as part of what constitutes 
 “ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?  ?>ƵŶĚďŽƌŐ ĂŶĚ sĂƵŐŚĂŶ-Williams, 2015). Elizabeth St. Pierre, Alecia Jackson, and Lisa 
Mazzei have explored the methodological consequences of new materialisms to bring about a novel 
form of empiricism conscious of the dangers of naïve (read Cartesian) images of thought (St. Pierre 
et al., 2016). Finally, Francesca Ferrando has explored the advances in bio- and nano-technologies 
pushing towards the posthuman and the cyborg (Ferrando 2013). Although all of these (among many 
other works building on the new materialist literature) address important social issues, it is difficult 
to see how commensurable they are. Whether it is the issues of breast-feeding provisions in the 
affordable care act, the conservation of sea microbes and jellyfish, the emotional connection 
between a stay-at-home father and his child, whether international discourses have forgotten 
material objects such as pipelines and tanks, ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “ŶĞǁ ? ŵĞĂŶƐ ĨŽƌ ĞůĞƵǌĞ ĂŶĚ 'ƵĂƚƚĂƌŝ ?or 
whether and how we are to become cyborgs  W the above articles provide in-roads for new 
materialisms that do not exactly match the radical, post-Marxist aspirations of its early defenders. 
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The question for us thus became: to what extent can a pluralism of new materialisms be compatible 
with the radical and emancipatory agenda of its founding theorists? 
 In this special section, WĂƵůZĞŬƌĞƚ ?Ɛ “dŚĞ,ĞĂĚ ?dŚĞ,ĂŶĚ ?ĂŶĚDĂƚƚĞƌ PEĞǁDĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ <ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ƚĂŬĞƐ Ă ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞůǇ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƚƵƌŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐ ƚŽ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŵĂĚĞ ďǇ ŶĞǁ
materialists to provide a strong political framing for their theory. Drawing on heterodox figures in 
the historical materialist tradition, Rekret shows that the very autonomy of human mental capacities 
over the material world can be understood as a material process, one that is inseparable from the 
history of divisions of labour and from capitalism in particular. On this view, Rekret argues that what 
ŝƐ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ŶĞǁ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ǁŽƌŬƐ ? ƚĂŬŝŶŐ DĞŝůůĂƐƐŽƵǆ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ĞŶŶĞƚƚ ? ĂŶĚ ĂƌĂĚ(2007) as 
examples, is a grounding of these new materialist doctrines in their own material conditions. Rekret 
goes on to argue that this lacuna leads all three authors to draw a voluntarist conception of political 
agency, one that leads us to a slippery slope where various phenomena are assigned independent 
agency instead of being critiqued and combatted in political terms. Rejecting new materialist 
ontologies as politically quietist, Rekret concludes that a materialist theory with emancipatory 
objectives would need to begin by locating the conditions for its own concepts in social relations. In 
the current contĞǆƚ ? ƚŚŝƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶĚ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
world given technological changes in recent decades.  
 
In conclusion, there are still many areas of lacuna in the new materialism literature, and we have 
argued that is better to conceive of these debates as ongoing sides of a productive debate, rather 
than as fatal flaws for the emerging field. In particular, we drew attention to the rather understudied 
historical dimension of the new materialism. It is not to say that specific authors are not aware of 
this dimension, but there is a clear over-emphasis on novelty as opposed to a continuation of an 
existing debate. Whether it is through the influence of the materialisms of Hobbes, Spinoza, or La 
Mettrie, we cannot ignore that the new is indebted to the old, and that these debates matter. It is 
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the hope of this special section to encourage historians to contribute to this debate on the new 
materialisms. We have also brought attention to issues emerging from the posthumanist dimension 
of new materialisms, particularly when it comes to the shaping of our political structures. Though 
the precise form these may take in a world where both human and nonhuman actants are given 
important weight is decision-making is still vague, the field remains open for novel and important 
contributions to be made to this debate, building on the work of Latour and others. Third, the 
question of technology has been brought to the forefront of new materialist debates, as it becomes 
apparent that technics is not a concept that can be side-stepped altogether. Building on the work of 
Stiegler, we have argued that taking the pharmacological nature of technics seriously, that is treating 
as both as a potential cure but also as a potential poison, is a productive way to move the debate 
forward for new materialisms. Finally, we have shown that emancipation remains an important 
commitment for materialism. Though the posthumanist and technological dimensions are clearly 
important, one needs to be remain eternally vigilant of the consequences these might have for 
emancipation of all species given our intertwined environment. This emancipation can only be 
conceived in differential terms given our climate histories. 
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